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THE TWO FACES OF SECTION 105 - AIRLINE
SHIELD OR AIRPORT SWORD
CALVIN DAVISON*
LORRAINE B. HALLOWAY**

I.

INTRODUCTION

ONGRESS ADOPTED landmark legislation in 1978
substantially deregulating the domestic air transportation system.' The theory behind this legislation was that
free entry into the system by new air carriers and expanded service by existing air carriers would provide better service and lower fares for passengers than the
detailed regulatory and restrictive entry policies that had
governed air transportation for most of its history.2 To
achieve these objectives it was necessary to prevent state
and municipal authorities from filling the regulatory vacuum created by Congress. Accordingly, Section 105' was
added to the Federal Aviation Act 4 as part of the Airline
Deregulation Act (ADA) of 1978. 5
Section 105(a)(l) prohibits states or their subdivisions
from regulating "rates, routes, or services of any air carrier having authority" issued under the Act. 6 Section
(

* Mr. Davison is a partner at Crowell & Moring, Washington, D.C.
* Ms. Halloway is an associate at Crowell & Moring, Washington, D.C.
Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.).
2 See generally H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1211, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-5 (1978).
49 U.S.C. app. § 1305 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
Pub. L. No. 85-726, 72 Stat. 731 (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. app.
§§ 1301-1522)(1982).
Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 49 U.S.C.).
t 49 U.S.C. app. § 1305(a)(1) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
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105(b)(1), however, provides that nothing in subsection
(a) shall limit the authority of states or their subdivisions
"as the owner or operator of an airport served by any air
carrier" from exercising their "proprietary powers and
rights." 7
Thus, Section 105 itself contained the seeds of conflict.
The courts have rendered conflicting interpretations of
Section 105's provisions, creating much uncertainty as to
the extent of the airport proprietor's authority. 8 The recent decision of the United States Court of Appeals for
the First Circuit in New England Legal Foundation v. Massachusetts Port Authority,9 invalidating landing fees at Boston's
Logan International Airport, underscores the tension
generated by the two subsections of Section 105.10
The two subsections of Section 105, on their face, raise
several interpretive issues. Which local actions relate to
"rates, routes, or services?" Do landing fees, for example, relate to rates because higher landing fees require
carriers to charge higher rates? What are "proprietary
powers and rights?" Can proprietary powers and rights,
whatever they are, be exercised in a way that affects
"rates, routes, or services" and, if so, are they perhaps no
longer proprietary powers and rights?
Prior to the passage of the ADA, certain airport powers
were generally recognized. Since the federal government
assumed no liability for noise, local airport proprietors
generally were permitted to regulate noise levels at their
airports." Additionally, airports were allowed to set their
own landing fees and their own terms for terminal and
gate space, provided, however, that the charges were
Id. § 1305(b)(1).
H See infra notes 102-169 and accompanying text.
7

883 F.2d 157 (1st Cir. 1989).
Id. at 173. In New England Legal Foundation, the First Circuit reviewed a district court's reversal of a Department of Transportation ruling that airport proprietor-imposed landing fees at Boston's Logan International Airport violated
Section 105(a). The district court had concluded that the landing fees were a
proper exercise of proprietary powers under Section 105(b). Id. at 162.
11See infra notes 15-55 and accompanying text.
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properly related to costs and were properly apportioned.' 2 Congress sought to preserve these rights when
it enacted Section 105.13 Courts interpreting Section 105,
however, have had difficulty drawing the distinction be4
tween the coverage of its two subsections.'
Since the operation of Section 105 is fundamental to
the deregulated status of the air transportation industry, a
proper balance between the statute's two subsections
must be struck. Part I of this article reviews the proprietary powers and rights of airports recognized prior to the
adoption of Section 105. Part II examines the legislative
history of Section 105 in an attempt to determine Congress' rationale for promulgating this section. Finally,
Part III analyzes the case law interpreting Section 105.
The article concludes that, while considerable confusion still exists in Section 105 case law, the contours of
permissible proprietor actions affecting airlines and airport access are beginning to emerge. Proprietors should
encounter the least legal resistance in exercising their
powers in the areas of ground congestion, terminal access, leasing, reasonable landing fees, noise and environmental concerns, and assignment of different roles to
individual airports when the proprietor controls more
than one. Proprietors will likely face more difficulty exercising their powers in the areas of access to airspace,
establishment of curfews unrelated to noise or in conflict
with federal standards, air safety rules, exclusion of new
entrants, and perimeter rules in single airport
jurisdictions.
I. PROPRIETOR POWERS AND RIGHTS RECOGNIZED PRIOR
TO

A.

1978

Noise Cases
Long before deregulation, the courts recognized that

" See infra notes 56-70 and accompanying text.
infra notes 71-101 and accompanying text.
14 See generally infra notes 103-162 and accompanying text.
',See
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the nature of air transportation requires a pervasive federal presence. In Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Minnesota,'5 Justice Jackson noted in his concurrence that aircraft are
subject to federal control from the moment they taxi onto
the runway for takeoff. 6 Other pre-deregulation cases
nonetheless recognized an exception to the otherwise total federal preemption of the regulation of air commerce
for certain types of requirements imposed by airport proprietors.' 7 This exception was principally restricted to
"reasonable, nonarbitrary and nondiscriminatory regulations that establish[ed] acceptable noise levels for the airport and its immediate environs. '"18
The pre-1978 exception reserved for airport proprietors was extremely limited. Consistent with the view of
322 U.S. 292 (1944).
id. at 303. Justice Jackson stated that
[fJederal control is intensive and exclusive. Planes do not wander
about in the sky like vagrant clouds. They move only by federal permission, subject to federal inspection, in the hands of federally certified personnel and under an intricate system of federal commands.
The moment a ship taxis onto a runway it is caught up in an elaborate and detailed system of controls. It takes off only by instruction
from the control tower, it travels on prescribed beams, it may be
diverted from its intended landing, and it obeys signals and orders.
Its privileges, rights and protection, so far as transit is concerned, it
owes to the Federal Government alone and not to any state
government.
Id. (Jackson, J., concurring).
See also American Airlines, Inc. v. Town of Hempstead, 272 F. Supp. 226, 232
(E.D.N.Y. 1967), aff'd 398 F.2d 369 (2d Cir. 1968) (holding that "[ilt would be
difficult to visualize a more comprehensive scheme of combined regulation, subsidization and operational participation than that which the Congress has provided
in the field of aviation."), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1017 (1969).
17 See, e.g.,
British Airways Bd. v. Port Auth. of New York & New Jersey, 558
F.2d 75 (2d Cir. 1977) [hereinafter Concorde I].
18Id.at 84. In Concorde I, the Second Circuit upheld the Port Authority's power
to abate noise generated by the supersonic transport Concorde during take-offs
and landings through a temporary ban on Concorde operations at John F. Kennedy International Airport. Id. at 85. In a later case, however, the same court
affirmed the district court's order dissolving the ban "until the Port Authority promulgate[d] a reasonable, nonarbitrary and nondiscriminatory noise regulation
that all aircraft are afforded an equal opportunity to meet." British Airways Bd. v.
Port Auth. of New York & NewJersey, 564 F.2d 1002, 1005 (2d Cir. 1977) [hereinafter Concorde II].
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Justice Jackson in Northwest Airlines, 9 the pre-19 7 8 cases
held that exclusive control of airspace allocation should
be concentrated at the national level, and communities
were therefore preempted from attempting to regulate
planes in flight.2 1 Only the task of protecting the local
population from aircraft noise fell to the local agency
which owned and operated the airfield.2 ' Preservation of
this limited role was based on the assumption that the
proprietor's intimate knowledge of local conditions would
result in an evenhanded weighing of the costs and benefits of proposed service to the community.2 2 Congress repeatedly reaffirmed its commitment to such a two-tiered
regulatory scheme prior to deregulation.23
One of the leading pre-deregulation noise cases was
,1,322 U.S. at 303 (Jackson, J., concurring).
See, e.g., Concorde H, 564 F.2d at 1010; American Airlines, Inc. v. Town of
Hempstead, 398 F.2d 369, 375-76 (2d Cir. 1968) (holding that the town's excessive noise ordinance was invalid to the extent it directly conflicted with valid federal regulations established by the FAA regarding the use of airspace for take-offs
and landings at nearby airport), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1017 (1969); Allegheny Airlines, Inc. v. Village of Cedarhurst, 238 F.2d 812, 815-17 (2d Cir. 1956) (finding
that the village could not prohibit aircraft from approaching nearby airport in
flight patterns under one thousand feet because Congress had set up a federal
administration agency specifically designed to carry out congressional policies of
federal airline regulation, including establishing national safe flight altitudes for
take-offs and landings).
21 Concorde I1, 564 F.2d at 1010-11.
The court determined that the airport
owner had "intimate knowledge of local conditions," and an "ability to acquire
property and air easements and assure compatible land use" which "would result
in a rational weighing of the costs and benefits of proposed service." Id. at 1011.
22 Id. As Justice Douglas recognized in a different context:
[Allegheny County, the owner and operator of the Greater Pittsburgh Airport] decided, subject to the approval of the [Civil Aeronautics Administration], where the airport would be built, what
runways it would need, their direction and length, and what land and
navigation easements would be needed. The Federal Government
takes nothing; it is the local authority which decides to build an airport vel non, and where it is to be located.
Griggs v. County of Allegheny, 369 U.S. 84, 89 (1962) (ordering county to pay
just compensation for taking air easement over petitioner's property).
2.1 See S. REP. No.
1353, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1968) (accompanying 1968
amendments to Federal Aviation Act); H.R. REP. No. 842, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 10
(1972); S. REP. No. 1160, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 10-11 (1972); 1972 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4655 (accompanying 1972 amendments to Noise Control
Act); see also Concorde H, 564 F.2d at 1011.
2
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American Airlines, Inc. v. Town of Hempstead, 24 in which nine
major United States-flag carriers, the Port of New York
Authority, the president of the Air Line Pilots Association,
and three airline pilots sued to enjoin the enforcement of
a local ordinance prohibiting anyone from operating a
mechanism or device, including aircraft, which created a
noise within the town exceeding either of two noise limiting spectra. 5 Plaintiffs, joined by the FAA as intervenor,
claimed the noise ordinance would prohibit aircraft using
nearby John F. Kennedy International Airport (JFK) from
flying over the town, and thereby restrict the landing and
takeoff patterns and procedures normally followed by
those aircraft.26
In the district court, the town argued that aircraft could
fly over the town in compliance with both the local ordinance and the FAA regulations governing landing and
take-off patterns and procedures.27 The district court,
however, made crucial findings of fact contradicting the
town's initial position that compliance with the ordinance
would be possible without altering flight patterns and
procedures. 28 The court held as follows: (1) the local ordinance was an unconstitutional burden on interstate
commerce; 29 (2) the area in which the ordinance operated
had been preempted by federal legislation; 30 and (3) the
24 272 F. Supp. 226 (E.D.N.Y. 1967), aft'd, 398 F.2d 369 (2d Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 1017 (1969).
2
272 F. Supp. at 227.
26 Id. at 228.
27
2"

Id.

Id. at 227-30.

Id. at 230. The district court concluded that
[t]he aircraft and its noise are indivisible; the noise of the aircraft
extends outward from it with the same inseparability as its wings and
tail assembly; to exclude the aircraft noise from the Town is to exclude the aircraft; to set a ground level decibel limit for the aircraft is
directly to exclude it from the lower air that it cannot use without
exceeding the decibel limit.

Id. at 232. The court noted that if the ordinance were upheld, neighboring
towns could impose different and inconsistent rules. This action would result in
an aircraft having to conform to the most exacting rule. Id.
- Id. at 232-33 (finding that congressional regulation was so pervasive as to
preclude enactment of the local ordinance).
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ordinance directly conflicted with valid applicable federal
regulation.'
On appeal,32 the town argued that the ordinance did
not unduly burden interstate commerce because the plan
allowed nearly all flights to and from JFK to avoid the
town with no effect on traffic capacity. 33 The Second Circuit was unpersuaded, however, and affirmed the district
court's ruling that the local curfew was invalid because it
directly conflicted with applicable federal regulation. 4 In
doing so, the appellate court agreed with the district court
that the FAA administrator had issued extensive regulations controlling the patterns and procedures of JFK air
traffic.3 5 The court found a direct conflict between the ordinance and the federal regulations, not because they imposed different standards for noise, but because
compliance with the local noise ordinance would require
changes in flight patterns and procedures established by
federal regulation. 6
Id. at 234-35 (holding that the ordinance prohibited flight paths specifically
approved by the FAA).
32 Ameican Airlines, Inc. v. Town of Hempstead, 398 F.2d 369 (2d Cir. 1968).
33Id. at 371. The court quoted the town's brief as stating "the Town has unveiled a plan pursuant to which approximately 987 of all flights (to and fromJFK]
will avoid the Town while, at the same time, the present traffic capacity will be
unaffected." Id.
34 Id. at 372. The court found no need to review the district court's alternative
grounds since its agreement as to direct conflict with federal regulation was sufficient. Id.
35 Id. at 373. The court held that the FAA administrator had issued regulations
"which unquestionably control the patterns and procedures of aircraft flying into
and out of JFK." Id.
36 Id. at 374-75. In reaching this conclusion, the Second Circuit relied on its
earlier decision in Allegheny Airlines, Inc. v. Village of Cedarhurst, 238 F.2d at
812, holding invalid a local ordinance prohibiting air flights over Cedarhurst at
altitudes of less than 1,000 feet. According to the American Airlines court, "[tihe
[Cedarhurst] opinion can be read either as a holding that the entire field of regulation of aircraft flight has been pre-empted by the federal government, or as a
holding that the particular ordinance involved was in direct conflict with the federal regulatory scheme." 398 F.2d at 375. Under either reading, "Cedarhurst is
square precedent for holding the Hempstead ordinance invalid, for in effect there
is square conflict between the local ordinance and federal regulation in each
case[." Id. at 375-376; see also Loma Portal Civic Club v. American Airlines, Inc.,
61 Cal.2d 582, 394 P.2d 548, 39 Cal. Rptr. 708 (1964) (rejecting argument that
regulation of aviation has been preempted by federal legislation and regulation
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Five years after the Second Circuit issued its decision in
American Airlines Inc. v. Town of Hempstead," the United
States Supreme Court considered the validity of local
noise abatement programs. 8 The case involved a 1970
City of Burbank ordinance prohibiting pure jet aircraft
from taking off from Hollywood-Burbank Airport between 11 p.m. and 7 a.m. and making it unlawful for the
operator of the airport to allow any such aircraft to take
off during those hours. 9 The airport owner and Pacific
Southwest Airlines sued in federal court to enjoin enforcement of the curfew. 40 The Air Transport Association
of America, representing the scheduled airlines, intervened as plaintiff; the FAA filed an amicus curiae brief in
support of the plaintiffs, and the State of California
filed
41
an amicus brief in support of the defendant city.
Relying on the earlier decision in American Airlines, the
district court concluded that the federal statutes and regulations, as well as the orders of the CAB and FAA Administrator, had occupied the fields of regulation of navigable
airspace use and aircraft operations to such a large extent
that no room was left for local regulations such as the City
of Burbank curfew ordinance.42 The court also concluded
that if the Burbank ordinance was held valid, similar ordinances might be adopted by all cities surrounding airports. The imposition of such curfew ordinances on a
but nevertheless affirming a refusal to enjoin flight operations at a public airport
at the behest of a property owner on the narrow ground that it is against the
policy of the State of California for a court to interfere with airport flight patterns
established by federal regulation).
-7

398 F.2d at 369.

- City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624 (1973).
39 Id. at 625-26. Only one scheduled flight was affected by the ordinance. Id. at
626.
40 Id. at 624.
Pacific Southwest Airlines (PSA) was the operator of the lone
flight departing from Hollywood-Burbank Airport during the curfew hours. The
departure was only once a week. Id.
41 457 F.2d at 670. The lower court discussed other procedural aspects of the
case and mentioned that nonscheduled aircraft also were affected by the curfew.
Id.
I Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc. v. City of Burbank, 318 F. Supp. 914, 925-926
(C.D. Cal. 1970), aft'd, 457 F.2d 667 (9th Cir. 1972), aff'd sub nom., City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624 (1973).
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national basis, the court felt, would have a near catastrophic effect on the national air transportation system,
the aviation industry, members of the traveling public,
and the national economy.4 3
The district court issued a declaratory judgment that
the ordinance was unconstitutional, as violative of the
Commerce Clause, and granted a permanent injunction
restraining its enforcement. 44 The Ninth Circuit affirmed
on the narrower ground that the ordinance was unconstitutional under the Supremacy Clause because Congress
had preempted the field, and the ordinance directly conflicted with a runway preference order issued by the FAA
to reduce community noise to the lowest level practicable. 45 The Circuit Court announced its decision in the appeal on March 22, 1972.46 On October 27, 1972-while
the case was pending before the Supreme Court-the
President approved the Noise Control Act of 1972, 47
which gave the Environmental Protection Agency responsibility for drafting aircraft noise control regulations for
consideration by the FAA.48
Justice Douglas wrote the 5-4 Supreme Court opinion
holding that the City of Burbank's curfew ordinance was
preempted by the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, as
amended by the Noise Control Act of 1972. 49 The majority held that the 1972 Act "reaffirms and reinforces the
conclusion that [the] FAA, now in conjunction with EPA,
has full control over aircraft noise, pre-empting state and
318 F. Supp. at 927-28. Noting that almost half of all air mail and air freight
is moved at night, the court reasoned that these operations would be seriously
interrupted. Costs would increase and new aircraft would have to be purchased to
meet the concentration of flights that would have to occur during permitted
hours. Id. at 927.
,4Id. at 930. The court concluded that it was Congress that should make decisions concerning the regulation of aircraft flight times. Id.
4
Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc. v. City of Burbank, 457 F.2d 667, 675-76 (9th
Cir. 1972).
Id. at 667.
47 Pub. L. No. 92-574, 86 Stat. 1234, 1239 (1972) (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 4901-4918 (1982)).
4. Id.
49 City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624 (1973).
4-1

102

JOURNAL OF AIR I4 WAND COMMERCE

[56

local control." 5' The preemption conclusion was based
on "the pervasive nature of the scheme of federal regulation of aircraft noise."5 1 The Burbank case unequivocally
held that state and local jurisdictions, operating under
their police powers, cannot undertake to manage aircraft
noise by imposing curfews or other operating restrictions.52 The case, however, left open the issue of airport
proprietor rights.
Following Burbank, one federal district court held that
single event noise exposure level prohibitions and criminal penalties, applied by airport proprietors pursuant to a
California statute, directed at noise generated by aircraft
engaged in flight "collide[d] head-on with the federal regulatory scheme for aircraft flights delineated by and central to the Burbank decision."5 " Another district court
upheld a municipal ordinance prohibiting all aircraft exceeding a certain noise level from landing and taking off
50 Id. at

633.

51 Id.
.52 See id. at 635 n.14.
A letter from the Secretary of Transportation expressed
the view that the 1972 Act would not affect the rights of a "State or local public
agency, as the proprietor of an airport, from issuing regulations or establishing
requirements as to the permissible level of noise which can be created by aircraft
using their airport" and that "[alirport owners acting as proprietors can presently
deny the use of their airports to aircraft on the basis of noise considerations so
long as such exclusion is nondiscriminatory." S. REP. No. 1353, 90th Cong., 2d
Sess. 7, reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 2688, 2693-94. Relying
on this letter, the city and the Solicitor General argued that a municipality with
jurisdiction over an airport had the power to impose a curfew on the airport,
notwithstanding federal responsibility in that area. The Court refused to confront
this argument head-on, instead characterizing it as an exercise of the city's police
power and not its authority as proprietor of the airport. The majority's failure to
decide what limits, if any, apply to airport proprietors, has contributed to the current confusion on the question.
.- Air Transp. Ass'n of America v. Crotti, 389 F. Supp. 58 (N.D. Cal. 1975). At
the same time, the court concluded that California's Community Noise Equivalent
Level ("CNEL") provisions and regulations were not per se invalid as regulating a
field of aircraft operation engaged in direct flight, which was pre-empted by federal law. The court left open the question whether CNEL requirements and regulations "are in fact unrealistic, arbitrary and unreasonable, and an abuse of police
powers constituting an unlawful burden or infringement upon any United States
constitutional right [or] privilege held by a proprietor of an airport, or an unreasonable burden upon interstate and foreign commerce as utilized by aircraft." Id.
at 65 (emphasis in original).
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at a commercial airport.-4 In that case, however, the city
was the proprietor of the airport.55
B.

Other ProprietorRights

A completely distinct line of pre-deregulation cases recognized the power of local airport authorities to set their
own landing fees and their own terms for terminal and
gate space, as long as those charges were properly related
to costs and were properly apportioned. In EvansvilleVandenburgh Airport Authority District v. Delta Air Lines, Inc. ,56
the Supreme Court held that neither the Commerce
Clause nor the Airport and Airway Development Act of
1970 precluded state or local authorities from assessing
head taxes on air passengers boarding flights at state or
local airports.57 The Court explained that "while state or
local tolls must reflect a 'uniform, fair and practical standard' relating to public expenditures, it is the amount of
the tax, not its formula, that is of central concern. ' 58 As
- National Aviation v. City of Hayward, 418 F. Supp. 417 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
The NationalAviation court rejected the Crotti court's interpretation of Burbank on
the ground that it overlooked the Supreme Court's statement that it was not considering the limits on the municipality as proprietor. Id. at 422-23. The district
court refused to enjoin the city from enforcing the challenged ordinance on preemption grounds, relying on Congress' statement that the 1972 amendment to
the Federal Aviation Act was not designed to "prevent airport proprietors from
excluding any aircraft on the basis of noise considerations." Id. at 424 (quoting S.
REP. No. 1353, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 7, reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2688, 2694).
ss 418 F. Supp. at 417.
405 U.S. 707 (1972).
57 Id. at 709, 720-21. Because of this ruling Congress enacted the Anti-Head
Tax Act in 1973. 49 U.S.C. app. § 1513 (1982). The statute forbids any state
agency to "levy or collect a tax, fee, head charge, or other charge, directly or
indirectly, on persons traveling in air commerce or on the carriage of persons
traveling in air commerce" other than "reasonable rental charges, landing fees,
and other service charges from aircraft operators for the use of airport facilities."
49 U.S.C. app. § 1513(a), (b) (1982). See generally Indianapolis Airport Auth. v.
American Airlines, Inc., 733 F.2d 1262 (7th Cir. 1984) (airport, in enacting ordinance setting fees for cost of firefighting, was not required to allocate cost proportionately to airlines and concessionaires); City & County of Denver v. Continental
Air Lines, Inc., 712 F. Supp. 834 (D. Colo. 1989) (Anti-Head Tax Act did not
prohibit use of surplus in capital fund representing payments from concessionaires to build replacement airport).
58405 U.S. at 716.
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"long as the toll is based on some fair approximation of
use or privilege for use ...and is neither discriminatory
against interstate commerce nor excessive in comparison
with the government benefit conferred, it will pass consti'59
tutional muster.
The Evansville standard was applied to several cases involving landing fees. In Raleigh-DurhamAirport Authority v.
Delta Air Lines, 60 for example, the district court invalidated, on state grounds, an airport-proprietor-imposed
landing fee of $.34 per 1,000 pounds of landing weight. 6 '
The court found the fee unreasonable because it "failed
to reflect the true average annual cost of operating the
airfield facilities at the Raleigh-Durham Airport" during
the relevant period.62 Similarly, in Southern Airways, Inc. v.
City of Atlanta,63 the district court held that a fee for twenty
percent equal allocation of maintenance and operation
costs for the Atlanta terminal's common space had a discriminatory effect and was unreasonable under the Airport and Airway Development Act.6 In American Airlines,
Inc. v. Massachusetts Port Authority,65 the First Circuit held
that because the "benefit conferred" on a user is so difficult to quantify, the fees should be measured for reasona59

Id. at 716-17.

429 F. Supp. 1069 (D.N.C. 1976).
61 Id. at 1084. The fees were calculated based upon total annual costs that in-

cluded impermissible items, such as excessive periodic maintenance costs and
bond debt service for unimproved airport expansion. Id. at 1081.
' Id. at 1084. The defendant airline, which refused to pay increased landing
fees, half-heartedly raised the question of whether the airport authority's "exercise of its state statutory authority in setting the fees was invalid as an unreasonable burden on interstate commerce in violation of Article I § 8 of the United
States Constitution." Id. at 1083. The court was satisfied that a fee reasonable
under the North Carolina statute also was acceptable under the Commerce
Clause. Id.
- 428 F. Supp. 1010 (N.D. Ga. 1977).
- Id. at 1019. At the same time, however, the district court held that charges
levied did not constitute an impermissible burden on interstate commerce and
that a revised formula for allocating maintenance and operation costs was nondiscriminatory when it was based in part on each airline's relative percentage of enplaned passengers. Id. at 10 19-22; see also Airport and Airway Development Act of
1970, 49 U.S.C. § 1718(1) (repealed 1982).
, 560 F.2d 1036 (lst Cir. 1977).
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bleness based upon the airport's incurred CoStS. 66
Finding in favor of the Port Authority, the court rejected a
constitutional67challenge to a fifty-two percent increase in
landing fees.
Prior to Evansville, one district court upheld a twentyfive dollar fee on each general aviation aircraft landing or
taking off from the three major New York airports during
certain peak hours.68 The sole justification for the fee was
congestion. The remedy chosen was designed to deter
the use of those airports by general aviation aircraft during peak hours and to divert traffic to Teterboro Airport,
which, along with the three major New York area airports,
was also operated by the Port Authority of New York.69
Another pre-Evansville case upheld the right of airport
proprietors to establish reasonable fees for commercial
aeronautical operations at airports.7 °

II.

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF SECTION 105:
CONGRESSIONAL INTENT TO PRESERVE
PROPRIETOR RIGHTS WITHOUT
GRANTING REGULATORY
POWERS

In light of a background in which certain airport proprietor rights were recognized, Congress sought to preserve
those rights in the deregulation legislation while at the
same time prohibiting states or localities from re-regulating air carrier rates, routes, or services.
Id. at 1039. The plaintiff airlines did not claim that the Massachusetts Port
Authority's fee discriminated against interstate commerce (or in favor of intrastate
commerce) or that the fee was based on an unfair formula. Rather, they claimed
the fee was excessive in comparison with the governmental benefit conferred. Id.
at 1038. The First Circuit followed the approach taken by other courts, which
focused on "whether the revenue raised by the fee roughly approximates the cost
of providing the facilities and services." Id.
67 Id. at 1037-39.
- Aircraft Owners & Pilots Ass'n v. Port Auth. of New York, 305 F. Supp. 93,
96 (E.D.N.Y. 1969).
- Id. at 98, 102.
70 City of Winner v. Lineback, 86 S.D. 165, 192 N.W.2d 705, (1971) (upholding
a city ordinance establishing fees for commercial operations at airport when city
ordinance was drafted to comply with FAA and state agency regulations).
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ProceduralHistory of Section 105

1. In the House of Representatives
On August 5, 1977, Representative Glenn Anderson of
California and five co-sponsors introduced H.R. 8813,
which was referred to the Committee on Public Works
and Transportation. 7 1 The bill contained both a provision preempting state regulation of "rates, routes and
services" and a proprietary powers exception.7 2 Representative Anderson reintroduced the bill as H.R. 12611
on May 9, 1978, and again referred it to the Committee
on Public Works and Transporation.73 The dichotomy
between regulation of "rates, routes and services" and
proprietary functions, found in the earlier House bill, was
preserved. On September 14, 1978, the House approved
H.R. 1261 1.74 The relevant portion of the federal preemption provision remained unchanged.75
2.

In the Senate

Senators Pearson and Baker introduced S. 292 on January 18, 1977, and referred it to the Committee on Commerce. 76 Senators Cannon and Kennedy introduced S.
689 on February 10, 1977, and referred it to the Commerce Committee. 77 Both bills contained provisions preempting state regulation of "rates, routes and services,"
but neither explicitly protected proprietary powers.78 On
7

72

123 CONG. REC. 27,858-60 (1977).

Id. at 27,860.

73 124 CONG. REC. HI3,101 (1978); Committee on Public Works and Transportation,
LegislativeHistory of the Airline DeregulationAct of 1978 (96-5) at 509-538 [hereinafter
"Report 96-5"].
74 124 CONG. REC. H29, 524-25 (1978).
75 See Report 96-5 at 664.
76 123 CONG. REC. S1,474 (1977) ("a bill to amend the Federal Aviation Act of
1958 to bring about the phased and progressive transition to an air transportation
system which will rely on competitive market forces to determine the variety, quality, and price of interstate and overseas air service, and for other purposes.").
77 123 CONG. REC. S4,213-20 (1977). The purpose was "to amend the Federal
Aviation Act of 1958 to economize, develop and attain an air transportation system which relies on competitive market forces." Id. at 4,273.
71, 123 CONG. REC. S1,475-89 and S4,213-20 (1977).
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February 6, 1978, Senator Cannon introduced S. 2493 as
reported from the Committee on Commerce, Science and
Transportation.79 Section 423 of the bill was substantially
similar to the earlier Senate bills.80 On April 19, 1978,
the Senate passed S. 2493 without revising the preemption provision. 81
3. Joint Action by Both Houses
On October 12, 1978, the Conference Committee submitted Report 95-1779, which struck a compromise between the Senate and House bills.82 The House version
of the preemption provision was adopted. 8 Both Houses
of Congress approved the Conference Report on October
14, 1978.84
B.

Excerpts from the Legislative History

1. History in the House of Representatives
Because division of the preemption clause into a general provision and a proprietary powers exception
originated in H.R. 8813,85 the history of this bill and its
successor, H.R. 12611, is of primary importance. There
are two relevant discussions in the history of these bills.
a. Representative Anderson's Section-by-Section Analysis of
H.R. 8813
In the September 23, 1977, floor debate on H.R. 8813,
Representative Glenn Anderson, the bill's principal sponsor, presented a section-by-section analysis of the newly
proposed legislation.86 According to Anderson, Section
124 CONG. REC. S2,194 (1978).
See S. REP. No. 631, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 39 (1978).
124 CONG. REC. S10,698-711 (1978).
82 124 CONG. REC. S36,513-41
(1978).
83 See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1779, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 94-95 (1978).
94
124 CONG. REC. 38,521 (1978) (House); 124 CONG. REC. 37,416 (1978)
(Senate).
w, 123 CONG. REC. 30,595 (1977).
86 Id. The analysis was intended to assist interested persons in understanding
the rather complicated provisions of the bill. Id.
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105 was intended to prevent the states from asserting regulatory responsibility in areas intentionally deregulated by
the federal government.8 7 Anderson stated that airline
deregulation legislation, might result in state enactment
of regulatory legislation "imposing restrictive utility-type
regulation on interstate airline service and fares." ' 88 To
counteract this possibility, the proposed airline deregulation bill contained a specific statutory provision intended
to prohibit states from taking such actions.8 9
According to Representative Anderson, the proprietary
powers exception was designed to protect, but not enhance, the existing authority of airport proprietors. 90 As
he stated, the preemption provision was "not intended to
preempt the exercise of normal proprietary functions by
airport operators, such as the establishing of curfews and
landing fees which are consistent with other requirements
in Federal law and do not unduly burden interstate
commerce." 9 1
b.

Testimony of Airport Operators Council InternationalBefore
the House Committee on Public Works and
Transportation

At the House hearing on H.R. 8813, J. Donald Reilly,
president of the Airport Operators Council International
("AOCI"), testified that it was particularly important to
municipal airport owners and operators that the drafters
acknowledged that the proposed bill did not change or
threaten "traditionalairportproprietaryrights."92 Despite the
changing regulatory environment, airport operators were
still solely responsibile for planning, constructing, and
87

Id.

Id.
8 Id. Representative Anderson stated that "[t]he Air Service Improvement Act
includes a specific statutory provision precluding state interference with interstate
service and fares." Id.
--

'

Id.

d.
Hearings on H. R. 8813 Before the Subcomm. on Aviation of the House Comm. on
Public Works and Transportation,95th Cong., 1st Sess., 2179, 2182 (1977) (emphasis
added).
9
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operating their airports. Reilly emphasized that this necessitated the continuing proprietary roles of state and local authorities. s Because the statement came from one of
the organizations most likely to benefit from an expansive
reading of the provision, it is particularly indicative, at
least indirectly, of Congress' intent to leave only the traditional authority of airport proprietors unchanged.
2.

History in the Senate

Although the preemption provision in S. 2493 did not
contain an explicit proprietary powers exception, the legislative history of the clause, Section 423 in the Senate
bill, also requires consideration. The history of Section
423 indicates that the Senate intended both to preclude
the states from occupying the post-ADA regulatory void
and to preserve the pre-ADA authority of airport operators. 94 For example, the CAB's section-by-section analysis
of proposed S. 292 and S. 689 stated that proposed Section 105 incorporated several federal court decisions
holding that the national government had complete jurisdiction over regulation of rates, routes and services in interstate air transportation.9 5 The CAB supported Section
105 because it only precluded state regulation that might
I9 Reilly stressed the following:
Id.
Of special importance to public airport owners and operators is the
bill's special recognition that traditionalairportproprietaryrights are not
altered or endangered by the changes proposed in the bill. Regardless
of the changed regulatory environment, airport operators will still
have the sole responsibility for planning, construction and operating
their airport facilities. This will require the continued unaltered proprietary roles and functions of state and local governments.
Id. (emphasis added).
Hearings on S. 292 and S. 689 Before the Subcomm. on Aviation of the Senate Comm.
on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 176 (1977). "The
new Section 105 would incorporate into the statute various court decisions which
hold that the Federal government has exclusive jurisdiction to regulate rates,
routes and service in interstate, overseas, and foreign air transportation." Id. at
191.
95 Id. The CAB report noted that "[t]he Board supports the provision" because
"[i]t would only preclude state regulation which could frustrate the intent of Federal regulatory reform legislation by substituting state utility-type regulation for
Federal regulation being loosened or withdrawn." Id.
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thwart the design of airline deregulation legislation. 96
The report of the Senate Committee on Commerce,
Science and Transportation on S. 2493 dealt primarily
with the preemption provision's function in coordinating
regulation of intrastate air services. 7 It included a short
paragraph indicating the Senate's intention to leave proprietary rights unaffected. The Senate's objective was to
prohibit state and local authorities from interfering with
routes, fares, and other charges while, at the same time,
permitting airport proprietors to manage, operate, and
regulate airports under their traditional proprietary
rights. 98

Two excerpts from the October 14, 1978, congressional
floor debate on the Conference Report further support a
narrow reading of Section 105(b)(1). The two colloquies,
one occurring in the House between Representatives
Anderson and Markey 99 and the other occurring in the
Senate between Senators Kennedy and Cannon, 10° are
nearly identical. Both suggest that the provision was
designed simply to protect the states' traditional authority
to impose user fees and other nondiscriminatory
mechanisms.10
'

Id.

S. REP. No. 631, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 39 (1978).
9"Id. at 99. "The prohibition ... against a State or subdivision enacting laws or
regulations that affect routes, rates, fares, or charges should not be construedto affect
or limit existing proprietary rights of airport operators to manage, operate or regulate
airports." Id. (emphasis added).
97

124 CONG. REC. H13,449 (1978).

124 CONG. REC. S18,799 (1978).
124 CONG. REC. H13,449 (1978).
MR. MARKEY: Mr. Speaker, I ask the gentleman from California
[Mr. Anderson] to engage in a brief colloquy with me to clear up an
ambiguity which does exist in the legislation. [Mr. Markey quotes
Sec. 105(a)(1)] I am concerned that long recognized powers of the airport
operators to deal with noise and other environmental problems at the local
level may be inadvertently curtailed by this section. Am I correct in
stating that actions of the airport operators, accepted as valid exercises of proprietary powers, are not intended to be interpreted as
"relating to-routes or services" of air carriers and are not intended
to be preempted by the powers created by this section?
MR. ANDERSON: That is correct. It was not the intent of the
House conferees to limit in any way the normal exercise of a propri-
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III.

COURT INTERPRETATION OF SECTION

105

Since 1978, the courts have applied Section 105 in numerous different contexts. Many of these cases invoke
Section 105 through the Supremacy Clause because most
courts have held that Section t 105
does not provide a basis
2
for a private right of action.
A.

Landing Fees and Airport Access

In a recent challenge to Massport's' 03 change in the
method of calculating landing fees at Boston's Logan International Airport, the First Circuit Court of Appeals adetor's powers to determine the level and nature of service to be provided at airports, subject to constitutional and statutory limitations.
Furthermore, I might add, it was not the intent of the House conferees to limit the exercise of the proprietors' established power to impose reasonable charges on tenants and users for the safe and
efficient operation of facilities, subject to constitutional and statutory limitations."
Id. (emphasis added).
Similarly, in response to the same question from Senator Kennedy, Senator
Cannon stated as follows: "That is correct. It was not the intent of the Senate
conferees to limit in any way the normal exercise of the existing proprietor's powers to place nondiscriminatory restrictions on the operations at an airport, subject
to constitutional and statutory limitations." 124 Cong. Rec. S18,799 (1978).
102 See, e.g., New York Airlines, Inc. v. Dukes County, 623 F. Supp. 1435, 144143 (D. Mass. 1985). But see New England Legal Found. v. Massachusetts Port
Auth., 883 F.2d at 171 n. 25 (questioning whether a private right exists under
Section 105, but, relying on American Airlines, Inc. v. Massachusetts Port Auth.,
560 F.2d 1036 (1st Cir. 1977), a pre-deregulation case, deciding the issue on the
merits). A Supremacy Clause claim exists, despite the lack of a private right of
action to enforce the statute because a claim "that a federal law preempts a state
regulation is distinct from a claim for enforcement of that federal law." Western
Air Lines, Inc. v. Port Auth. of New York & NewJersey, 817 F.2d 222, 225 (2d Cir.
1987), cert. denied sub nom. Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Port Auth. of New York & New
Jersey, 485 U.S. 1006 (1988). This distinction is consistent with the view that a
claim under the Supremacy Clause simply asserts that a federal statute has displaced local authority to regulate a certain activity. An implied right of action, on
the other hand, is a means of enforcing the substantive provisions of a federal law,
including provisions authorizing plaintiffs to recover monetary or other damages.
Id.
,o Massport is a commonly used term referring to the Massachusetts Port Authority. "Massport is a public instrumentality of the Commonwealth of Masschusetts which owns and operates the public port facilities of the Commonwealth,
including those at Logan Airport in Boston and at Hanscom Field in Bedford,
Massachusetts." New England Legal Found. v. Massachusetts Port Auth., 883
F.2d at 159.
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dressed the seemingly conflicting subsections of Section
105. The federal district court had earlier concluded that
Massport's landing fees did not violate Section 105(a) because they were reasonable and, thus, a valid exercise of
Massport's proprietary power.' 0 4 The Department of
Transportation (DOT) Secretary, however, concluded
that the fees were unreasonable because they were based
on improper cost allocation methodology and constituted
an attempt to control rates, routes or services.' 0 5 The
Secretary determined that Section 105(a) preempted the
fees Massport sought to impose. 106 The case thus
presented an ideal opportunity for the First Circuit to
shed light on the meaning and scope of Section 105's two
apparently conflicting subsections. 0 7
At the onset of its Section 105 analysis, the First Circuit
observed that by reducing federal economic regulation of
air transportation to increase competition in the marketplace, "Congress obviously did not intend to leave a vacuum to be filled by the Balkanizing forces of state and
local regulation."' 0 8 By enacting Section 105(a), Congress expressly preempted state and local regulation;
while Section 105(b) permits "local authorities to operate
airports as proprietors, this grant is not unlimited and is
subject to curbing if it transgresses into the general field
reserved for federal interest."' 10 9
The First Circuit held that Massport's landing fee structure violated Section 105, as well as other sections of the
Federal Aviation Act, because it indirectly prohibited use
04 Id. at 162.
,o5 Id. at 165.

106Id.

,07Id. at 173. The First Circuit decided that the district court should have deferred to the primary jurisdiction of the Department of Transportation (DOT)
because of its pervasive administrative regulation and control of the field of aviation, Within that scheme, the federal agency's determination of a "reasonable"
landing fee is of central importance. Id. Thus, the appellate court reviewed the
DOT decision on the Section 105 issue pursuant to the standards in 5 U.S.C.
§ 706 (1988). Id.
'ONId.
I(09

Id.
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of Boston's Logan International Airport by small aircraft."10 In doing so, the First Circuit rejected Massport's
argument that the Evansville standards of reasonableness
and nondiscrimination applied when the challenged local
legislation allegedly offended a specific federal statute as
well as the Commerce Clause. I' According to the Massachusetts Port Authority panel, the Supreme Court in Evansville ruled only that state and local authorities are not
precluded by the Commerce Clause or the Airport and
Airway Development Act of 1970 from assessing head
taxes on air passengers boarding flights at state or local
airports." 2 The court found that, in response to the Evansvile holding, Congress had enacted the Anti-Head Tax
Act in 1973."1
In Massachusetts Port Authority, the court noted that when
congressional action is the source of contention, courts
have looked to that specific source to determine whether
the legislation preempts local authority. "4 The court
found the Evansville standard" 1 5 both inconsistent with the
extensive and preclusive regulatory scheme for a uniform
national aviation system and contrary to the DOT's recognized exclusive grant of administrative enforcement
,no Id. The court noted that "Massport could not pass a direct regulation
prohibiting the use of Logan by small aircraft or decide upon the type of aircraft
that could land there, or the times when such activities could take place." Id.
(citing 49 U.S.C. app. §§ 1304, 1348(a), 1508). The court found that
"[p]articularly when one considers the revenue neutral effect of [Massport's new
fees], the new landing fee regulations appear to be an attempt to modify conduct
(e.g., control air traffic) rather than to recover operational costs, and are thus an
incursion into an area of regulation preempted by Section 105(a)." Id. at 174.
'it Id.
112 Id.
-S Id. "Evansville is the precursor of the Anti-Head Tax Act previously discussed." Id.; see id. at 170. For the text of the Anti-Head Tax Act see 49 U.S.C.
app. § 1513 (1982).
114 883 F.2d at 174.
115 See Evansville-Vandenburgh Airport Auth. Dist. v. Delta Air Lines, Inc. 405
U.S. 707 (1972). Under the standard announced by the Supreme Court, a charge
that is "based on some fair approximation of use or privilege for use . . . and is
neither discriminatory against interstate commerce nor excessive in comparison
with the governmental benefit conferred" will pass constitutional muster even
when another formula might reflect better the relative use of individual users. Id.
at 716-17; see also supra notes 56-59 and accompanying text.
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16
under Section 511 of the Federal Aviation Act."
Two other cases involving airport access were never decided on their merits. In the first case, New York Air
sought judicial relief when it was refused permission to
serve Martha's Vineyard Airport. t7 In denying defendant's motion to dismiss, the district court found that the
county's denial of New York Air's request to operate at
the airport was sufficient to raise a Supremacy Clause
claim based on Section 105(a)(l)." The court never adjudicated the merits of the case and refused to consider
the applicability of Section 105(b)(1), holding that the
question required a factual determination and was not,
therefore, justiciable pursuant to a motion to dismiss.' '9
Similarly, the effort of Midway Airlines to serve West20
chester County Airport was never judicially resolved.
The court held that, pursuant to Section 105(b)(1), the
county could at least defer Midway's entry pending the
opportunity to consider the safety and environmental impact of admitting a new carrier.' 2' The case eventually

1,6 Massachusetts Port Auth., 883 F.2d at 174. Indeed, the First Circuit found Evansville contained language supportive of the Secretary's decision, since the case
instructs courts not only to judge a tax by its result rather than its formula but also
that " 'distinctions based on aircraft use do not render [user] charges wholly irrational as a measure of the relative use of the facilities for whose benefit they are
levied.'" Id. at 174-75 (quoting Evansville 405 U.S. at 718-19). As the First Circuit observed, "Massport's scheme seems to do exactly the opposite." 833 F.2d at
175.
,,7 Dukes County, 623 F. Supp. at 1435.

- Id. at 1442. Compare Rocky Mountain Airways, Inc. v. Pitkin County, 674 F.
Supp. 312, 319-20 (D. Colo. 1987) (holding that the Supremacy Clause could not
be used as a basis for invalidation of county regulations imposing landing fees and
rental charges on air carriers using Denver's Stapleton International Airport when
certain provisions of the Anti-Head Tax Act "manifest a clear Congressional intent not to preempt state and local regulation of terminal rental and landing fees."
(emphasis in original).
- Dukes County, 623 F. Supp. at 1442. No evidence outside the pleadings had
been presented to the district court. "Defendant's contention that the refusal of
access ... was based on legitimate proprietary interests excluded from preemption under section 105(b) .

.

. cannot properly be considered on the motion to

dismiss. These issues will necessarily involve factual determinations..." Id.
120Midway Airlines, Inc. v. County of Westchester, 584 F. Supp. 436 (S.D.N.Y.
1984).
121 Id. at 440.
The court found that the county was entitled to a reasonable
period of time to "study the status quo arrangement and develop rational and
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was settled by a stipulation between the county and airline
setting forth a methodology for allocating the limited terminal capacity. Here the airport proprietor was engaged
in allocating limited space in a ground facility. The
county did not purport to attempt regulation of landings
run afoul of the
and takeoffs per se, which may well have
22
FAA's exclusive control of airspace.1
B.

Curfews and Other Noise Cases

In another case involving the Westchester County Airport, a federal district court held that the county did not
have a proprietorship right to impose a strict curfew on all
night flight operations without examining the accompanying noise issue.' 2 3 Relying on pre-1978 noise cases, the
court held that a curfew imposed by a local proprietor
without regard to accompanying emitted noise was an unreasonable, arbitrary, discriminatory, and overbroad exercise of power by the county. 24 This case established that
the exercise of a valid proprietorship right must be reasonable, nonarbitrary, and nondiscriminatory and must
not impose an unconstitutional burden on interstate
commerce. 125
nondiscriminatory rules for allocating scarce space and landing and take-off slots,
consistent with local environmental and safety needs." Id. The court ordered the
county to conclude its study within thirty days and to issue space allocation rules
"within twenty days thereafter." Id. at 441.
122 See 49 U.S.C. app. § 1305(a) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
123 United States v. County of Westchester, 571 F. Supp. 786 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
The county sought to ban all flights between midnight and seven in the morning
"except in the case of emergency." Id. at 794.
12. Id. at 797.
25 See, e.g., United States v. New York, 552 F. Supp. 255, 265 (N.D.N.Y. 1982),
aff'd, 708 F.2d 92 (2d Cir. 1983) (finding statutory curfew at local airport overbroad, unreasonable, arbitrary, and constitutionally impermissible in view of federal preemption of aviation field when the curfew extended to all aircraft,
regardless of noise emitted, and only fourteen flights occurred during forbidden
hours). But see Global Int'l Airways v. Port Auth. of New York & New Jersey, 727
F.2d 246 (2d Cir. 1984) (upholding local noise Interim Rules when plaintiffs failed
to show any conflict between federal Fleet Compliance Regulations and local limits on cumulative noise exposure).
The importance of the proprietor being the one taking the action is illustrated
in San Diego Unified Port Dist. v. Gianturco, 651 F.2d 1306 (9th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 455 U.S. 1000 (1982). Here the airport proprietor was contesting the right
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C. Perimeters
Three cases subsequent to 1978 have considered an airport proprietor's right to establish a perimeter for permissible nonstop service to and from a particular airport.
Two of these cases upheld the right of an airport proprietor to establish a perimeter for one airport when it operated other airports that could be served with flights
beyond the perimeter. In the first case,1 26 the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that Section 105 did not apply
to the issue because the FAA, not a state or local entity,
was the airport proprietor. 27 The court upheld the
agency's establishment of a 1,000 mile perimeter for nonstop flights to and from Washington's National Airport.128
The Court noted that the FAA also operated nearby Dulles Airport which was not subject to such stringent
29
restrictions.
In the second case,' 30 an airline challenged the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey's imposition of a
1,500 mile perimeter rule at LaGuardia Airport. The district court upheld the rule as a proper exercise of a proprietor's power to take measures to alleviate ground
congestion.'1' As in City of Houston,t32 the court relied on
the fact that the proprietor had available another airport
of the state to require it to enforce an 11:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m. curfew on the
landings and takeoffs of air carriers. The court held that the state was without
authority to enforce the curfew. Section 105(a)(1) was held not to be directly
applicable. Id. at 1310.
126 City of Houston v. FAA, 679 F.2d 1184 (5th Cir. 1982).
127 Id. at 1194.
128 Id. at 1199.
129 Id. at 1187, 1191.
13oWestern Air Lines, Inc. v. Port Auth. of New York & New Jersey, 658 F.
Supp. 952 (S.D.N.Y. 1986). In this action, Western Air Lines alleged that the
perimeter rule violated various federal aviation statutes, as well as the Civil Rights
Act of 1871, and was invalid under the Supremacy, Equal Protection, Due Process,
and Commerce Clauses of the United States Constitution. Id. at 954.
1' Id. at 960. The court based its holding on a study done by the Port Authority which concluded that a 1500-mile rule was necessary to diffuse increasing congestion problems. Id.
,-2 679 F.2d at 1191.
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that was not so limited. 33
When the proprietor only operated one airport, however, its effort to restrict service by establishing a perimeter for flights was struck down. 13 4 Consequently, in the
third perimeter case, 135 the district court concluded that
the Orange County, California policy of rerouting all
flights covering more than 500 miles from John Wayne
Airport to Los Angeles International Airport, a facility
over which the proprietor had no authority, constituted
an impermissible interference with interstate air
service. 136
D. Leases
Consistent with pre-1978 cases, an airport proprietor
has the authority to negotiate leases with airlines on a
nondiscriminatory basis under Section 105(b)(1). At least
one state court held that failure of an airline to sign such a
1 37
lease was grounds for eviction.
In Montauk-CaribbeanAirways, Inc. v. Hope,' 38 the Second
Circuit found that an airport owner was exercising its proprietary rights when it refused to modify its ten-year lease
with an air carrier.' 39 Furthermore, the court held that an
airport authority was exempt from federal antitrust laws
by virtue of the Local Government Antitrust Act of 1984
and the state action doctrine. 40 Section 105(a) was not
,3 658 F. Supp. at 958. Neither Newark International Airport nor John F. Kennedy International Airport were subject to the perimeter restrictions. Id.
134 See Pacific Southwest Airlines v. County of Orange, No. 81 Civ. 3258 (C.D.
Cal. Nov. 30, 1981).
,35 Id.
136 Id.
137 See, e.g., County of Broome v. Commuter Airlines, Inc., 83 A.D.2d 742, 442
N.Y.S.2d 652 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981). The New York Supreme Court, Appellate
Division, found that "[riespondent's [the airline] claim that the petitioner's refusal
to renew the lease violates section 105(a)(1) . . . is also meritless." Id. at 742, 442
N.Y.S.2d at 654-55.
- 784 F.2d 91 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 872 (1986).
139 Id. at 97
("[tlhe leases are a valid exercise of the Town's proprietary
rights.").
14o Id. at 97-98. The court utilized a Cort v. Ash
(422 U.S. 66 (1975)) analysis
to determine whether a private right of action existed. Consistent with Cort, the
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directly implicated, however, because the court held that
the statute did not provide a private right of action and
the airline had failed to assert a Section 105(a) claim
based on the Supremacy Clause.141
E.

Other Cases

While not directly involving the question of proprietor
rights, post-1978 cases dealing with service conditions
and airline rates also have interpreted Section 105. For
example, in Hingson v. Pacific Southwest Airlines,'42 a blind
man, Michael Hingson, filed handicap discrimination
claims under both state and federal law after he was
evicted from a Pacific Southwest Airlines flight for refusing to sit in a bulkhead seat.' 4 3 The Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals found that Section 105 preempted the claim
brought under the California Civil Code, since the regulation of air carrier seating policies for handicapped passengers involved the regulation of services within the
meaning of Section 105(a)(l).14 4 In so deciding, the court
rejected Hingson's argument that Section 105(a)(1) only
preempted those state laws that conflict with federal
law.145 The court pointed out that the statute preempted
state laws and regulations relating to rates, routes, and
services. Relying on Hingson, the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia 46 also held that Section 105 preempted a blind plaintiff's claim that USAir
had violated a common law obligation to provide "equal
court looked at several factors: whether plantiff was a member of a class for whose
benefit the statute was enacted; congressional intent; whether a private right was
consistent with the purpose of the statute; and whether the issue was a traditional
state matter. Id. at 97.
'4t Id
743 F.2d 1408 (9th Cir. 1984).

42

Id. at 1411. The plaintiff brought claims under § 404(b) of the Federal Aviation Act, § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, § 54.1 of the California Civil
Code, intentional infliction of emotional distress, assault and battery, false imprisonment and the use of unnecessary violence and force under California Civil
Code § 2188. Id. at 1411-16.
143

,44Id. at 1415.

Id.

145

Anderson v. U.S. Air, Inc., 818 F.2d 49 (D.C. Cir. 1987).

14,1
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and courteous service to all"'' 47 when it refused
to allow
48
him to sit in an aisle with an emergency exit.
Consistent with these cases, the Fifth Circuit recently
vacated a district court's damage award, finding that Section 105 preempted a state common law claim for wrongful exclusion from an aircraft. 49 Similarly, in Stone v.
American Airlines, Inc.,t50 a federal district court held that
Section 105 preempted a state court's jurisdiction over a
suit contesting the legality of American Airlines' ticket
cancellation fees. 15'
In Illinois Corporate Travel, Inc. v. American Airlines, Inc. ,152
a travel agency alleged that American Airlines had violated state statutory and common law by refusing to allow
it to sell tickets at discounted prices.15 3 The federal district court found that enforcement of state law in this case
could potentially cause the rates for airline tickets in Illinois to differ from rates available in other states. 54 The
court held that such a result was contrary to Congress'
purpose in passing Section 105.55 In Trans World Airlines,
Inc. v. American Coupon Exchange,' 56 the American Coupon
Exchange contested the legality under the California Civil
Code of TWA's tariffs restricting the assignability of frequent flyer certificates. 57 The district court found that
the tariffs had the effect of federal law, thereby preemptId. at 56.
Id. at 56-57.
149 O'Carroll v. American Airlines, Inc., 863 F.2d 11 (5th Cir.), cert. denied sub
nom. O'Carroll v. Chaparral Airlines, Inc., 109 S.Ct. 3158 (1989). The court concluded that because the plaintiff brought action under only state law claims, the
federal district court lacked jurisdiction. Id. at 13.
No. 86-C5783 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 19, 1987) (1987 WESTLAW 6856).
ld. The court held that Section 105 was applicable because resolution of
I5
the claim would necessarily require consideration of the airline's rates. The court
consequently dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Id.
152682 F. Supp. 378 (N.D. Ill. 1988).
-, Id. at 379.
154 Id. at 380.
I5 Id. at 379. The court observed that "any state law rule of decision which
could cause rates for airline tickets in one state to differ from those in other states
is preempted" by federal legislation. Id.
156 682 F. Supp. 1476 (C.D. Cal. 1988).
147
148

157

Id. at 1481.
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ing any contrary state law.' 5 8
Agreeing with the Seventh Circuit in Illinois Corporate
Travel, the Fifth Circuit recently held in Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Mattox,' 59 that "airline fare advertising 'relates
' 6°
to' rates within the meaning of [Section] 1305(a)(1)."'
Although state laws against deceptive advertising are not
aimed specifically at commercial air carriers and do not
attempt to set rates, the court found that such laws "relate
to" rates when applied to airline fare advertising.' 6 1 The
court concluded, therefore, that state action to enforce
state laws regulating air carriers' fare advertising is expressly preempted by the Federal Aviation Act. 162
When state or local regulation has been found to have
no appreciable effect on air carrier routes, rates, or services, courts have generally rejected Section 105 challenges to such regulation. For example, the Ninth Circuit
rejected a claim, raised for the first time on appeal, that
Section 105 preempted the California Public Utilities
Commission's state telephone regulation when applied to
air carriers. 63 Although the court found that no private
right of action existed under Section 105, it noted in dicta
that the state telephone regulation involved did not ap158Id. The court noted that a tariff "is law, not a mere contract." Id.
1- 897 F.2d 773 (5th Cir. 1990).
1- Id. at 783.
16,

Id.

Id. at 784. At issue in TWA v. Mattox was the airline industry's practice of
unbundling fares, that is, not including certain fees in the total advertised fare.
TWA and other airlines sued to enjoin Texas Attorney General Mattox's attempt
to enforce National Association of Attorneys General (NAAG) guidelines related
to airline advertising. The guidelines required any fuel, tax, or other surcharge
on air fares to be included in the total advertised price of the fare. The district
court had granted the injunctive relief sought and subsequently broadened it to
include thirty-three additional state attorneys general who had adopted the
NAAG guidelines. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Mattox, 712 F. Supp. 99, 101,
105 (W.D. Tex. 1989).
The New York Supreme Court has similarly held, in an action involving the
New York Attorney General's attempt to enjoin TWA's advertising of unbundled
fares, that Congress has expressly preempted the area of airline fares. See Abrams
v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., No. 1536, 41703/89 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 1, 1990)
(1990 WESTLAW 69622).
-3 Air Transp. Ass'n of America v. Public Util. Comm'n of Cal., 833 F.2d 200
(9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S.Ct. 2904 (1988).
162
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64
pear to relate to rates, routes, or services of air carriers.
Similarly, a California state court found Section 105 offered an airline no protection from a state suit for allegedly false and misleading statements in its advertising
promotions. 65 Further, in another case, the Minnesota
Supreme Court concluded that Section 105 preempted
the state's licensing requirement for air ambulance services, but that the state was not preempted from regulating
other aspects of the delivery of medical services.' 66 Also,
Section 105 has been held not to preempt a regional planning agency's control, for environmental purposes, of
flights into the local airport. 167 When state regulation relates to air safety, however, such regulation has been held
preempted. 168 Finally, Section 105 has been found not to
69
preempt state judicial power to enforce valid contracts.'
CONCLUSION

The outlines of permissible proprietor actions affecting
1- Id. at 207.
165 People v. Western Airlines, Inc., 155 Cal. App. 3d 597, 202 Cal. Rptr. 237
(1984), cert. denied sub nom. Western Airlines, Inc. v. California, 469 U.S. 1132
(1985). The court found that because the suit did not challenge Western's rates,
routes, or services, Section 105 did not insulate the airline from liability. 155 Cal.
App. 3d at 597, 202 Cal. Rptr. at 239.
- Hiawatha Aviation v. Minnesota Dept. of Health, 389 N.W.2d 507 (Minn.
1986).
167 City of South Lake Tahoe v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 664 F. Supp.
1375 (E.D. Cal. 1987) (The district court based its decision in large part on the
fact that Congress had ratified the compact from which the agency derived its
powers, thereby suggesting that Section 105 was not intended to preempt the
agency's authority).
-6 See French v. Pan Am Express, Inc., 869 F.2d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 1989)(refusing to
decide whether a Rhode Island drug testing statute regulated "rates, routes or
services" as prohibited by Section 105(a)(1) but concluding in any event that congressional intent to occupy the field of pilot regulation relating to air safety could
be inferred from the ADA).
169 See Stream Aviation, Inc. v. Anders Prod., Inc., 517 So.2d 1157 (La. Ct. App.
1987), writ denied, 521 So.2d 1171 (1988) (rejecting the argument that state enforcement of a contract with a carrier not properly certified by the FAA would
undermine the federal agency's licensing requirements, thereby violating Section
105). But see Arkwright-Boston Mfrs. Mut. Ins. v. Great W. Airlines, Inc., 767 F.2d
425 (8th Cir. 1985)(citing Section 105 and concluding that the question of interpretation of limitation on liability contained on Federal Express airbills was governed by federal common law).
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air carriers and access to airports are beginning to emerge
from court decisions interpreting Section 105. If the airport proprietor operates multiple airports, it can establish
a permissible nonstop service perimeter at one of those
airports to achieve valid proprietor concerns, such as alleviating ground congestion. If, however, a proprietor operates only one airport, the establishment of a perimeter
which limits the services of air carriers at the airport is
probably not permissible.
An airport proprietor also can establish rational and
nondiscriminatory leasing policies and enforce compliance with leases entered into pursuant to such policies.
Landlord-tenant issues probably are central to the role of
a proprietor. On the other hand, the latitude of the proprietor in this area is not unfettered. Arbitrary exclusion
of a new carrier from an airport, for example, probably
will run afoul of Section 105 and other applicable legal
provisions.
Regulation of noise and other environmental concerns
has traditionally been a role for proprietors. Nevertheless, that power remains narrowly circumscribed, as it was
before deregulation. First, for the regulation to be sustainable in most cases, such regulation must be enacted by
the airport proprietor, not just any political entity. Second, the proprietor must act in a rational and nondiscriminatory manner. Arbitrary curfews or exclusions of
service without reference to some reasonable standard
will probably be struck down.
With respect to landing fees, airport proprietors have
limited authority. They may enact fees to recover operational costs, but they cannot impose fees that either lack a
rational basis or are unfair relative to the benefits conferred or costs incurred. Airport proprietors may not
adopt fees that are designed to have the effect of modifying air carriers' services at a particular facility or that impede other federal goals.
Thus, proprietors should have little difficulty exercising
their authority in the areas of ground congestion, terminal
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access, leasing, reasonable landing fees, noise and environmental concerns, and assignment of different roles to
individual airports when the proprietor controls more
than one. On the other hand, proprietors will likely encounter preemption problems if they attempt to control
access to airspace, establish curfews unrelated to any
noise standard or in conflict with federal standards, exclude new entrants, set rules that touch on air safety, or
establish a perimeter rule for a single airport when the
proprietor does not offer alternatives. Of course, any attempt by proprietors to directly set fares and rates
charged by air carriers or to regulate the routes they fly or
services they offer is precluded by Section 105.

